Since 2006, Hans Gersbach holds the Chair of Macroeconomics: Innovation and Policy at ETH Zurich (Switzerland). He is also Director of CER-ETH at Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich and a CEPR-Research Fellow in Public Policy and Industrial Organization. He is a member of the academic advisory council at the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology in Germany and a member of the steering committee of the Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research (KOF) at ETH Zurich. He is also an IZA and a CESifo Research Fellow.
Current research focuses on the design of new economic and political institutions for the well-being of societies. His research also includes macroeconomic policy design, innovation and growth, epidemic diseases and financial stability. In these fields, he has published extensively in renowned scientific journals.
Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions, Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming, 2010. (with Theresa Fahrenberger)
Democratic Mechanisms, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming, 2009.
The Affectionate Society: Does Competition for Partners Promote Friendliness?, Economic Theory, 40, 2009, 389-403. (with Hans Haller)
When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency, Economic Theory, 25(1), 2005, 105-121. (with Hans Haller)
The Money-Burning Refinement: With Application to a Political Signalling Game, International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 2004, 67-87.
Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 2001, 347-368. (with Hans Haller)
Collective Bargaining, Awareness of General Equilibrium Effects and Unemployment, International Economic Review, forthcoming, 2010 (with Achim Schniewind)
The Macroeconomics of Targeting: The Case of an Enduring Epidemic, Journal of Health Economics, 28(1), 2009, 54-72. (with Clive Bell)
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect, Economic Journal, 119, 2009, 1208-1224. (with Amihai Glazer)
Productivity Improvements in Public Organizations, Economic Journal, 115(505), 2005, 671-688. (with Marten Keil)
Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(5), 2009, 831-853. (with Volker Hahn)
Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, forthcoming, 2009. (with Bernhard Pachl)
On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109(2), 2007, 225-243. (with Harald Uhlig)
Do Risk Premia Protect from Banking Crises?, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 12, 2008, 100-111. (with Jan Wenzelburger)
Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(1), 2007, 133-149. (with Volker Hahn)
Debt Contracts and Collapse as Competition Phenomena, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5(4), 2006, 556-574. (with Harald Uhlig)
The current financial crisis is characterized by a massive deterioration of liquidity and trust among participants. This can be witnessed especially in the interbank markets, which after the Lehman Brother’s debacle essentially completely dried up. How can markets be made functioning again? How can trust be restored? How can the financial system be repaired? What should be the pillars of a new financial order? These are the main issues the project attempts to address. Three main themes will be pursued:
1. How does market information affect market liquidity and the informational content of market prices? How can such prices be useful for regulatory policies. For example, which role should they play for accounting purposes?
2. How should securities be priced, when arbitrage is impaired, e.g. for lack of liquidity?
3. How do behavioural features such as ambiguity aversion and loss aversion affect market prices and market liquidity?
Ultimately, the insights from basic research about individual behaviour and the reactions of the marekt system will provide guidance into the basic pillars a new financial order might be based upon.