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Doris L. Bergen

The Nazi Concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and the Exacerbation of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 1939–45

Hitler himself supposedly coined the definition of 'Volksdeutsche' that appeared in a 1938 memorandum of the German Reich Chancellor. The Volksdeutsche, that document rather blandly explained, were people whose 'language and culture had German origins' but who did not hold German citizenship.¹ But for Hitler and other Germans of the 1930s and 1940s, the term 'Volksdeutsche' also carried overtones of blood and race not captured in the English translation 'ethnic Germans'. According to German experts in the 1930s, about thirty million Volksdeutsche were living outside the Reich, a significant proportion of them in eastern Europe — Poland, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Romania.² The Nazi goal of expansion to the east ensured that Volksdeutsche in those areas occupied a special place in German plans.

Memoir literature attests to the fact that some of the Volksdeutsche in eastern Europe contributed far more than silent acquiescence to the betrayal and murder of their Jewish neighbours during the Holocaust.³ Individual ethnic Germans stole Jewish property, participated in Nazi-sponsored pogroms, and turned in Jews who tried to pass as Aryans. In more subtle ways too, the Volksdeutsche contributed to the explosion of genocidal anti-Semitism in eastern Europe under Nazi tutelage.

It might seem unproductive to examine connections between anti-Semitism and the Volksdeutsche of eastern Europe in the Nazi era. After all, what remains to be learned? Anti-Semitism predated Nazism in the region by hundreds of years, and those inhabitants of eastern Europe whose ancestry could somehow be deemed German were by no means alone in their hostility toward Jews and Judaism. Nor did they distinguish themselves from the Poles,

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Ukrainians, Lithuanians or Romanians around them in their willingness to express that hatred in violent attacks on Jews.⁴

But we can learn something new if we shift the focus from the ethnic Germans themselves to the question of how the nazis conceived 'ethnic Germanness'. This essay argues that the way National Socialist ideology defined 'Volksdeutsche', the policies nazi authorities based on that definition, and the essential tenuousness of the concept itself, contributed to the production of even more widespread and virulent forms of anti-semitism than the region had known. Earlier attacks on Jews in eastern Europe, rooted in Christian tradition, tended to combine brutality with attempts to convert or force assimilation. Nazism's concern with ethnic 'Germanness' was one factor in the devolution of that Church-based anti-semitism into active support of genocide.

Nazi racial policy was two-pronged. It involved both the eradication of those people deemed impure — Jews above all, Gypsies, and certain mentally or physically handicapped people, the so-called 'lives unworthy of living' — as well as the promotion of those identified as valuable Aryans. In the east, the second half of this dual policy meant locating ethnic Germans and designating them as the beneficiaries of genocide. In October 1939, Hitler charged Heinrich Himmler, the man who would orchestrate implementation of the so-called Final Solution, with the task of administering the web of agencies, organizations and regulations set up to identify, re-educate and resettle the Volksdeutsche.⁵ In much the same way as nazi authorities made laws, regulations and institutions to define and deal with Jews, they constructed a complex bureaucracy to handle ethnic Germans.⁶

The concept of 'Volksdeutsche' played an important role in nazi racial policy. In the closed system of National Socialist thought, the mere existence of the Volksdeutsche provided some legitimation for the murder of millions. The idea that ethnic Germans would inherit the homes and possessions of people whom nazi ideology defined as unworthy Jewish lives made the so-called struggle for living space more concrete. At the same time, the notion that pure Germans had somehow been trapped outside the Reich and forced to suffer under alien rule provided Hitler's forces with a pretext to overrun eastern Europe. If the Volksdeutsche had not existed, the nazis might have invented them.

Indeed, in some cases, the archival record suggests that Germans

practically did invent the *Volksdeutsche*. In August 1941, for example, the Nazi murder squad 'Einsatzgruppe B' reported from Smolensk that it had located a number of ethnic Germans. According to the report, however, intermarriage had so alienated those people from their roots that their claim to 'Germanness' was now tentative at best. Despite that admission, the *Einsatzgruppe* considered it in Germany's 'ethnic-political interests' to carve out a special status for those dubious *Volksdeutsche* in relation to the rest of the population. Accordingly, the *Einsatzgruppe* requested additional allocations of food and preferential treatment with regard to housing for the group.⁷ For the purposes of the *Einsatzgruppe*, the existence of people who could be labelled '*Volksdeutsche*' was more important than the cultural or racial authenticity of such claims.

In a fundamental way, the dichotomy in Nazi racial policy between Jews and *Volksdeutsche* created incentives for open support of anti-semitic activity. Nazi regulations made ethnic Germans the prime beneficiaries of property stolen from Jews. When Germans and their helpers deported and murdered Jews, they often reassigned the homes left vacant to ethnic Germans who either came from the region in question or had been resettled there.⁸ The *Einsatzgruppen* who slaughtered Jews in the Soviet Union in 1942 also distributed 'loot, cattle, and harvesting machines' to the ethnic German population, 'making available the houses and belongings of Jews and so on'.⁹ On Himmler's order, various agencies distributed to the people identified as ethnic Germans under the Nazis' resettlement programme clothing and household effects seized from Jews who had been killed in death camps and elsewhere.¹⁰ Jewish belongings, from thermos bottles to baby carriages, mirrors and sunglasses, were collected for the *Volksdeutsche*. Instructions to relevant agencies stressed the importance of removing the Jewish star from all clothing.¹¹

Jews who experienced expropriation witnessed how greed increased the ranks of their enemies. Many of the most eager predators, some Jewish observers noted, the newly minted ethnic Germans, were in fact their old Polish or Ukrainian neighbours. A Jewish survivor from Radomsko recalled a Polish chemist who 'declared himself a *Volksdeutsche*' in order to take over a family enterprise that manufactured paints and dyes.¹² Another survivor from the same town suggested that a Ukrainian family simply 'became *Volksdeutsche*' in order to claim the flat of a Jewish man

who collected antiques.¹³ Meanwhile, an official report submitted to the Foreign Office in April 1944 confirmed that, in Hungary, the 'sanitizing actions' of invading German troops engaged in 'the solution of the Jewish question' had indeed had very favourable effects for ethnic Germans there.¹⁴ And once in possession of Jewish belongings, the ethnic Germans retained a vested interest in promoting the Nazi cause. Nazi racial policy had given them what they had and their continued claim to those possessions rested on the racialist assumptions inherent in the National Socialist world view.

There were negative incentives as well to induce potential ethnic Germans to comply with Nazi racial policy. The relevant regulations factored political reliability into determinations of ethnicity. The 'Deutsche Volksliste' was set up in 1941 to gather information on ethnic Germans and divide them into four categories, ranging from the 'pure and politically clean' specimens of category one to the 'renegades' of category four who had to be won back to 'Germanness'. Members of all four groups qualified for resettlement. Politically undesirable men and women, however, were to be sent to concentration camps. Moreover, SS and police officers were to supervise the Germanization process; in cases where parents neglected the Germanic training of their offspring, the children were to be taken away and given to other homes.¹⁵ In February 1942, Himmler himself ordered that people of German ancestry who failed to put themselves on the list could be sent to concentration camps.

Nazi policies regarding the Volksdeutsche exacerbated anti-semitism by stirring up greed for possessions seized from Jewish victims. But there was another, less obvious, way that the concept of 'ethnic Germanness' fostered hatred. The very tenuousness of the notion, which we might expect to have mitigated its destructive effects, in fact served to worsen the plight of Jews in eastern Europe.

Nazi ideology assumed clear-cut categories. It expected ethnic Germans to be easily identifiable — from their appearance, language, habits of living and qualities such as cleanliness, willingness to work hard and devotion to National Socialism.¹⁶ But when Nazi authorities tried to implement policies regarding the Volksdeutsche, they found that concept to be full of contradictions, unclarities and absurdities. Over decades and centuries, settlers from German-speaking Europe had intermarried with their neigh-

bours. Many had changed their religious allegiances, adopted or adapted cultural practices, abandoned the German language or transformed it in ways alien to the German ear. Nazi authorities used a combination of cumbersome bureaucracy and simple arbitrariness in their attempts to sort out this ethnic mix. The results, however, often disappointed believers in racial purity.

In 1944, for example, SS reports from across occupied eastern Europe complained bitterly about the absence of qualities associated with Germanness among the supposed ethnic Germans. SS officials in the Wartheland grumbled that the *Volksdeutsche* sent from Russia spoke only Polish, Russian or Ukrainian and had forgotten how to work.¹⁷ Other Gau authorities protested that the ethnic Germans they were expected to resettle lacked proper German family values. As soon as their husbands were out of the picture, one reporter carped, the women took up with Ukrainians and Poles. The men, the account continued, were no better; they slept with Polish women and assumed the cultural habits of Poles, while the youths were lazy and promiscuous.¹⁸

So instead of finding pockets of pure Germanness preserved in the east, observers from Germany discovered ethnic Germans who had been influenced by the culture of their neighbours, even in some cases their Jewish neighbours. A German Protestant visitor to colonies of *Volksdeutsche* in Poland remarked that their language reflected a 'Jewish jargon'.¹⁹ Some ethnic Germans had even married Jews. In 1944, the resettlement programme for *Volksdeutsche* in Galicia encountered such a case. An ethnic German woman who had divorced her Jewish husband applied for resettlement. The SS questioned whether she or her children qualified for inclusion in the programme. It was Himmler who ultimately decided that the mother could be accepted for resettlement without the two children. They could only enter Germany as charges of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, and only if they were sterilized.²⁰

Contemporaries did not fail to notice the many difficulties associated with defining *Volksdeutsche*. When the Ministry of Justice proposed a new marriage law, it planned to prohibit German citizens from marrying foreigners. Drafters of the law wanted to make an exception for ethnic Germans, but 'the difficulty of delineating ethnic Germans in a clear and unambiguous way' persuaded them not to do so.²¹ Jewish observers, too, noted the hollowness of the notion of *Volksdeutsche*. A Polish survivor describes members of a putatively ethnic German organization,

the *Selbstschutz*, as 'people from our town, Poles'. With the nazi presence, she pointed out, they 'suddenly heard the call of their German blood! Mostly they were scum: ex-jailbirds, card-sharps, thieves, petty (and not so petty!) crooks'.²²

Given the difficulties of defining Volksdeutsche, aspiring ethnic Germans in the east found the easiest way to prove themselves good Germans was to prove themselves good nazis. And the easiest way to establish nazi credentials was by endorsing and actively implementing attacks on Jews. Nazi authorities further encouraged that tendency by fostering an atmosphere of uncertainty around the identification of Volksdeutsche. They constantly altered rules and regulations, making it possible for ethnic Germans to be reclassified or even declassified. In May 1941, SS authorities announced that ethnic Germans in the Baltic states who had not registered for the first resettlement programme in 1940 could no longer be considered for government service. By passing up the earlier opportunity to co-operate, SS officials reasoned, those people had demonstrated their deficient commitment to Germanness.²³ In August 1941, Einsatzgruppe B in Smolensk asked the military not to issue permanent identification papers for ethnic Germans, so that the option of reassessing an individual's status would remain open.²⁴

But even while they quibbled over the details of what constituted an ethnic German, nazi authorities showed themselves more concerned with destroying Jews and expanding German power in the east than with maintaining the purity of their own ideological principles of Germanness. In early 1940, the Minister of the Interior announced that, in the interests of the fatherland, Volksdeutsche should be defined as generously as possible. Political reliability was not to play a role in that consideration.²⁵ Himmler took expansion of the category further. Sometime in 1940/41, he ordered the Germanization of 'racially valuable Poles'. If sufficient numbers of ethnic Germans were not on hand, that programme implied, Hitler's underlings could simply create more. Himmler tried to lure Poles into the scheme with promises of property and economic advancement, presumably at Jewish expense.²⁶

As the war dragged on, nazi authorities openly distorted the definition of Volksdeutsche in order to expand the ranks of the Waffen-SS. In April 1944, German officials in Hungary announced that ethnic Germans there would perform their mili-

tary service in the Waffen-SS. The Germans accompanied that decision with a new, more generous definition of Volksdeutsche. The Hungarian government had based its count of 720,000 on the assumption that ethnic Germans were those who identified themselves as such and were recognized by the ethnic German leadership. In 1944, nazi authorities opted to dispense with any formal definition, basing the decision instead on an interview with the individual in question. In this way, the Germans reported, they could add several hundred thousand people to the original count of Volksdeutsche in Hungary.²⁷

In the west, too, nazis showed that they were willing to relax the definition of Volksdeutsche in order to recruit more men to the Waffen-SS. In 1942, the Ministry of the Interior announced unrestricted rights of German citizenship to anyone of German ancestry in Alsace, Lorraine or Luxembourg who joined or was conscripted into the Waffen-SS. Two German grandparents sufficed to establish German ancestry.²⁸

Turning to the Christian churches of eastern Europe, we again see how the notion of Volksdeutsche served to exacerbate anti-semitism. In two important ways, developments related to ethnic Germans as members of Christian communities paralleled issues discussed above. On the one hand, the tenuousness of the concept of Volksdeutsche encouraged anti-semitism as a way of establishing German credentials. On the other hand, nazi authorities, in an attempt to placate the churches in the east, further distorted their own principles of ethnic Germanness but in ways that only worsened the situation of the Jews.

Many ethnic Germans understood piety as intrinsic to their German identity, whether they were Lutherans surrounded by Catholic Poles, Roman Catholics living among Orthodox Romanians, Baptists or Mennonites in Ukraine. For those self-conscious religious minorities, religion and ethnicity were mutually reinforcing. In June 1938, a Sudeten German pastor called the Protestant Church 'the last bulwark of the *völkisch* idea in Sudeten Germany';²⁹ for an ethnic German pastor in Romania, Germanness and the Lutheran faith formed two sides of the same coin.³⁰

Christian piety may have been crucial to the self-identity of many ethnic Germans in eastern Europe, but given nazism's antagonism toward Christianity, it was unacceptable as the central component in a definition of Volksdeutsche. Nazi authorities

repeatedly criticized ethnic Germans for their devotion to their churches. In 1943, SS authorities, with the backing of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt, resisted demands to allow additional clergy to minister to ethnic Germans in the Generalgouvernement. Ethnic Germans, nazi officials worried, would simply exploit any such appointments for the propaganda purposes of their own religious agenda.³¹ Under no circumstances, stressed SS correspondence in 1944, were the confessional ambitions of ethnic Germans to be encouraged. Any strengthening of the church, senior SS men predicted, would come back to haunt the regime.³²

Instead of rejecting the nazi definition of Volksdeutsche as irreconcilable with their Christian identity, spokesmen of some ethnic German religious groups became more aggressively anti-semitic as an alternate way of establishing Germanness. Some church publications of the ethnic German Lutheran community in Poland, for example, became increasingly vocal in their attacks on Jews after 1933, moving from an emphasis on traditional themes of Christian anti-Judaism to echo nazi racial and political anti-semitism.³³ In 1935, an ethnic German church paper from Posen reported on the 30,000 Jews who had emigrated to Palestine in the previous year, but used discussion of topics that had nothing to do with church matters simply to promote hatred toward Jews. The article depicted the Jews in Palestine not as a religious community, but as communist Zionists who cared nothing for the God of the Old Testament, felt loyalty only to Jewish blood and even ate pork.³⁴

In 1936, *Glaube und Heimat*, a publication of ethnic German Lutherans in Poland, bemoaned the fact that the size of Poland's Jewish population would make it difficult to imitate Germany's 'solution of the Jewish question'. The church paper quoted a Polish senator who had remarked that there were one million Jews too many in Poland and added its own parenthetical commentary: '(Only one million? In Poland there are a total of about four million Jews!)'³⁵ In May 1940, an ethnic German pastor in Bohemia who wanted to ingratiate himself with the German authorities made sure to point out that his church 'stood on the ground of a Jew- and dogma-free Christianity'.³⁶

In March 1942, nine months after Romania entered the war, the German Protestant Church there founded its own group affiliated with the Institute for Research into and Elimination of Jewish Influence in German Church Life, a loudly anti-Jewish organiz-

ation founded by members of the pro-nazi 'German Christian Movement'.³⁷ In an age of racial awakening, the German bishop in Romania argued, the Old Testament was not only dispensable but untenable because it simply made it harder for German people to come to Jesus.³⁸ The church, another ethnic German pastor in Romania agreed, would grow accustomed to thinking in racial terms.³⁹ The fact that ethnic Germans in eastern Europe partook in a Christian tradition of anti-Judaism provided a base on which nazi anti-semitism could develop. The concept of *Volksdeutsche* in turn helped transform that traditional Christian anti-Jewishness into nazi anti-semitism.

While the ethnic German churches took on traits of nazi anti-semitism, nazi authorities in eastern Europe also showed some willingness to accommodate the piety of the *Volksdeutsche* when it furthered their own ends. Such compromises reflected contradictions within nazism about the nature and place of Christianity. At the same time, these concessions made it easier for ethnic Germans to embrace genocidal anti-semitism while adhering to their religious traditions.

Nazi ideologues liked to claim that their ideas about race had nothing to do with religious considerations; in reality, however, even their putatively racial definition of Jewishness was based on religion — the faith of one's grandparents was the determining factor. Conversely, when it came to defining *Volksdeutsche*, membership in a Christian church was not enough, since most of the ethnic Germans' neighbours were Christian as well. At the same time, the variety of denominational affiliations among ethnic Germans made it impossible to employ more specific religious distinctions. Thus, while the nazis used religion to separate Jews from non-Jews, they needed other criteria to differentiate ethnic Germans from non-German Christians.

Despite the ideological and practical problems that Christianity posed with regard to the *Volksdeutsche*, under some conditions the nazis were prepared to use religion to win support from ethnic Germans for their racial goals. In early 1943, for example, SS officials suspended their resistance to pandering to ethnic German piety long enough to appoint some additional clergy for *Volksdeutsche* in the *Generalgouvernement*. Internal correspondence made it clear that the gesture was primarily symbolic, calculated as a way to enhance ethnic German loyalty. National Socialist officials selected the most politically reliable clergy they could find,

but in such small numbers that they would be virtually ineffective, except to convince the Volksdeutsche that the nazis were on their side.⁴⁰ Eight pastors from Transylvania, home to a branch of the Institute for Research into and Elimination of Jewish Influence in German Church Life, were finally sent to minister to their ethnic German brethren in Poland.⁴¹ Through this concession, nazi authorities hoped to tighten the bond between the piety of the Volksdeutsche and the anti-Jewish cause.

By facilitating the fusion of Christian anti-Judaism and nazi anti-semitism, the concept of Volksdeutsche helped produce something both more virulent and destructive than the former and more effective than the latter alone. The revised anti-semitism that resulted from that alliance was more vitriolic than traditional Christian anti-Judaism because it abandoned the idea of potential conversion of Jews in favour of a policy of extermination. It was more effective than nazi ideas alone because the churches' willingness to tolerate and even promote it generated a broader base of support.

Careful attention to the concept of 'Volksdeutsche' and to the history of its employment in nazi hands shows it could neither be articulated coherently nor substantiated empirically. Yet, instead of impeding the advancement of nazism's genocidal plans, the very tenuousness of the notion of 'Volksdeutsche' actually contributed to the intensification of anti-semitism. In this way, the National Socialist understanding of 'Volksdeutsche' proved itself to be not only conceptually bankrupt, but morally disastrous as well.

Notes

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1. See Minister Lammers to senior officials of the Reich, 25 January 1938, 'Betrifft: Formulierung der Begriffe "Deutschtum im Ausland, Auslandsdeutscher und Volksdeutscher"'. Bundesarchiv Potsdam (hereafter BA Potsdam) 51.01/23905. For general discussion of nazi policy towards the Volksdeutsche, see Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945* (Chapel Hill, NC and London 1993).

2. See 'Brüder in der Fremde', no author, in *Glaube und Heimat. Bilder-Bote*

für das evangelische Haus, Monatsbeilage zum Evangelischen Gemeindeblatt 'Glaube und Heimat', 3 (March 1935), 22. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Bonn (hereafter Bonn AA) R 82089. After the war, an official with the Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums (Stabshauptamt) from 1939 to 1944 recorded the number of ethnic Germans in the incorporated eastern territories to have been approximately one million. See 'Eidesstattliche Erklärung', Hans-Joachim Goetz, 3 October 1947. Institut für Zeitgeschichte Munich (hereafter IfZ Munich) NO 5321.

3. For example, Volksdeutsche appear as perpetrators in such well-known memoirs as Alexander Donat's *The Holocaust Kingdom* (New York 1963); Leon Wells's *The Death Brigade (The Janowska Road)* (New York 1963, 1978); and Adina Blady Sz wajger's *I Remember Nothing More* (New York 1988).

4. Anyone who does research in this area learns to expect a language of hatred in the sources. But sometimes still surprising is the pride with which some eastern Europeans pointed to their history of anti-semitism. For example, in 1941, in response to SS complaints that Romania was protecting its Jews, Romanian President Michael Antonescu sent an emissary to the German ambassador to remind him of the 'old, fundamental hatred toward the Jews' that existed in Romania, 'which had been the basis of earlier, energetic actions against them'. See telegram from Killinger to Foreign Office, attached to copy of 'Aufzeichnung', signed Erdmannsdorff, 15 October 1941. IfZ Munich NG 3989.

5. See 'Erlaß des Führers und Reichskanzlers zur Festigung deutschen Volkstums, vom 7. Oktober 1939', (copy) Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BA Koblenz) R18/5468/fiche 1/13–15.

6. A number of regulations were key to the handling of the Volksdeutsche. See especially Himmler's 'Erlaß über die Überprüfung und Aussonderung der Bevölkerung in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten vom 12. September 1940 — I/KO 3 b/23.3.40'; 'Verordnung über die Deutsche Volksliste und die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten vom 4. März 1941 (RGBl.I S.118)'; Ministry of the Interior in conjunction with the Party Chancellery and Himmler: 'Erlaß vom 13. März 1941 I c 5425/41/500c Ost'; and 'Erlaß des Führers und Reichskanzlers vom 7.10.1939'. All are discussed in 'Allgemeine Anordnung Nr. 12/g über die Behandlung der in die Deutsche Volksliste eingetragenen Personen', signed Himmler, Reichsführer SS and Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, 9 February 1942, (copy) BA Koblenz R18/5468/fiche 2/153–160.

7. Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 29 August 1941, 'Ereignismeldung UdSSR. Nr. 67', (copy), 10–11. This is part of the report of Einsatzgruppe B, Standort Smolensk, IfZ Munich NO 2837.

8. For more information regarding the redistribution to ethnic Germans of goods seized from Jews, see 'Eidesstattlicher Erklärung, Edgar Hoffmann', 3 September 1947, IfZ Munich NO 5125. Hoffmann, an official first in the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost (HTO) and later in staff headquarters of the Reichskommissar für die Festigung des Deutschen Volkstums, points out that the goods seized from Poles and Jews were handled in an identical fashion. Additional detail can be found in 'D. Einzelfragen des Osteinsatzes', signed Greifelt, SS-Brigadeführer and Dr Winkler, head of the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost (undated, but probably late 1940). IfZ Munich NO 5149.

9. See report issued by the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 'Ereignismel-

dung UdSSR Nr. 95', 26 September 1942, section titled 'Einsatzgruppe D. Standort Nikolajew', 42. IfZ Munich NO 3147. Additional information regarding the activities of Einsatzgruppe D in turning homes and furniture of Jews over to ethnic Germans is to be found in the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes' partial translation of document no-4489, letter, Chief of the Security Police and of the SD, 4 October 1941, Berlin, Operational Situation Report USSR No. 103, Report of Einsatzgruppe D. IfZ Munich NO 4489.

10. Himmler to Chef des SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamtes, SS-Obergruppenführer Pohl, and to Chef des Hauptamtes Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz, 24 October 1942. IfZ Munich NO 606.

11. Photocopy, letter signed I. V. Frank, SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS, to Leiter der SS-Standortverwaltung Lublin; Leiter der Verwaltung des K. L. Auschwitz. 26 September 1942, 'Betr.: Verwertung des Besitzes anlässlich der An- und Aussiedlung der Juden'. IfZ Munich NO 724, 4.

12. Stefania Heilbrunn, *Children of Dust and Heaven: A Collective Memoir* (Johannesburg 1978), 75.

13. *Ibid.*, 70.

14. Copy, Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, signed H. Hezinger, to Auswärtiges Amt, Legationsrat Dr Reichel, Berlin; 22. Mai 1944. 'Monatsbericht April 1944 über die Lage in den Deutschen Volksgruppen'. IfZ Munich NG/d 5351-5460.

15. Circular from Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei, Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums, A 2 Nr. 420 VII/41, 176, to a series of addressees, including die Obersten Reichsbehörden, 10-fach; die Länderregierungen (außer Preußen), 10-fach, die Herren Reichsstatthalter, 10-fach; Gauleiter; Oberpräsidenten und Regierungspräsidenten in Preußen; Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer; Staatspolizei(lei)stellen; and nachrichtlich on a series of others, 16 February 1942: 'Betrifft: Behandlung der in Abteilung 4 der Deutschen Volksliste eingetragenen Personen'. BA Koblenz R 18/5468/fiche 2/161-166.

16. One can find repeated references from ethnic Germans to the alleged German proclivity for hard work. For example, see G[ünther], 'Der deutsche Nationaltag', *Deutscher Bote in Norwegen, Nachrichtenblatt der deutschen Behörden, Gemeinde u. Vereine* (Oslo: Nr. 7, April 1934): 45, Bonn AA R 61681: 'Wir Auslandsdeutsche wissen besonders gut, daß man Arbeitsamkeit, die Fähigkeit zu ausdauernder, zäher, unermüdlicher Arbeit als eine hervortretende Eigenart der Deutschen ansieht. Man meint ja sogar, wir Deutschen arbeiten zu viel . . .'

17. Copy of report, 'Ansiedlung weiterer Rußlanddeutscher im Gau Wartheland', undated but sent to Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (SS-Obersturmführer Dr G. Wolfrum) from NSDAP Reichsleitung, Hauptamt für Volkstumsfragen, Bad Ischl-Kaltenbach, 20 July 1944, signed SS-Standartenführer (signature illegible). BA Koblenz R59/65/fiche 3/132-36.

18. 'Ansiedlung weiterer Rußlanddeutscher im Gau Wartheland', BA Koblenz R59/65/fiche 3/132-36.

19. Gerda von Klitzing, 'Bei unseren Brüdern in Polesien und Wolhynien', *Glaube und Heimat*, 17 September 1933, Nr. 38. AA Bonn R 82088. Another church publication griped about the fact that Jews were infiltrating the 'pure German colonies of Wolhynia, buying land, and settling down'. *Posener Evangelisches Kirchenblatt*, 6 (March 1934), 245, 'Kleine Mitteilungen'. AA Bonn R 82088.

20. Certified copy of SS-Obersturmbahnführer (signature illegible) to the Reichs-

kommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums – Stabshauptamt – Schweiklberg/Post Vilshofen Ndb., 10 February 1944. IfZ Munich NO 5342.

21. See circular and attached draft of new marriage law, signed Dr Gurtner, Reich Ministry of Justice, to Reichsminister: 'Verabschiedung des Gesetzentwurfs über die Eheschließung Deutscher mit Ausländern durch die Reichsregierung'. BA Potsdam 51.01/23544, 3.

22. Heilbrunn, op. cit., 71.

23. Circular, Reichsführer SS, signed SS-Brigadeführer Greifelt, an die Obersten Reichsbehörden, 'Vorgang: Übernahme von Flüchtlingen aus den Baltenländern in den öffentlichen Dienst'. 16 May 1941. BA Potsdam 51.01/23952.

24. Report: Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 29 August 1941, 'Ereignismeldung UdSSR. Nr. 67', 10–11. IfZ Munich NO 2837.

25. Copy, Reichsminister des Innern an den Herrn Reichsminister für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, I Ost 1107 II/39/4021, 4 January 1940. BA Potsdam 51:01 RKM/23912.25.

26. 'Eidesstattliche Erklärung', Hans-Joachim Goetz, 3 October 1947, 5–6. IfZ Munich NO 5321.

27. Certified copy, H. Hezinger, Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, to Auswärtiges Amt, Legationsrat Dr Reichel, 22 May 1944: 'Monatsbericht April 1944 über die Lage in den Deutschen Volksgruppen', 3. Cover letter, signed SS-Obersturmbannführer Rimann, says enclosed is the report for April 1944 of Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. IfZ Munich NG/d 5454.

28. Sonderabdruck Nr. 82 aus dem Ministerialblatt des Reichs- und Preußischen Ministeriums des Innern 1942, Nr. 35: 'Staatsangehörigkeit der Elsässer, Lothringer und Luxemburger', '1. Erwerb der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit', 2. BA Potsdam 51.01 RKM/23916.

29. Presentation by Pastor Polednik, in 'Bericht über die 50. Jahreshauptversammlung des Evangelischen Bundes Sachsen-Anhalt in Naumburg (Saale), 12–14 Juni 1938', 7, Archiv des Evangelischen Bunds in Bensheim, EB 3.05.19. For more information on the organization of the German Protestant 'diaspora' church in the Sudetenland, in an article clearly intended to win sympathy for the supposed plight of ethnic Germans, see 'Die deutsche evang. Diaspora-Kirche in Böhmen und Mähren', *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 460 (7 October 1938), clipping in BA Potsdam Reichlandbund collection (RLB)/1864, 136.

30. Wilhelm Staedel, 'Die Volkskirche der Siebenbürger Sachsen. Vortrag, gehalten im Rahmen der "Kulturwoche", welche im Herbst 1960 von der Landsmannschaft der Siebenbürger Sachsen in Zusammenarbeit mit ihrem Patenland Nordrhein-Westfalen veranstaltet worden ist', 1, BA Koblenz, Nachlaß Staedel (NL 252)/18.

31. Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, signed I. V. Müller SS-Gruppenführer, to the Höheren SS- und Polizeiführer im Generalgouvernement — SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, 16 January 1943. BA Koblenz R59/65/fiche 1/28–9.

32. Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, signed 'In Vertretung, Müller, SS-Gruppenführer, "An die Reichsleitung der NSDAP — Hauptamt für Volkstumsfragen — z. Hd. von SS-Brigadeführer Cassel"', 18 April 1944'. BA Koblenz R59/65/fiche 1/25–7.

33. In general, the *Posener Evangelisches Kirchenblatt*, copies in AA Bonn R 82089, showed a marked increase in 1935 of anti-Jewish articles. See, for example, Arthur Rhode's tribute to Adolf Stoecker in No. 3 (December 1935), 102–9.

34. 'Die Juden in Palästina', no author, *Posener Evangelisches Kirchenblatt*, 6 (March 1935), 241. AA Bonn R 82089.
35. 'Polen und die Judenfrage', no author, *Glaube und Heimat*, 10 (8 March 1936). AA Bonn R 82089.
36. Rudolf Ceh, Pfarrer der Böhm.-mähr. Kirche in Hrotowitz/Protektorat/ als Bevollmächtigter des Zentralrates der Böhm.-mähr. Kirche in Prag, to Reichsministerium für kirchliche Angelegenheiten in Berlin, 14 May 1940. BA Potsdam 51.01/21655.
37. Security Service report: 'Kirchenpolitisches aus der Tagespresse' (September/October 1942), 1. Bonn AA R 98843.
38. Wilhelm Staedel, 'Thesen zur Frage des Alten Testaments, im Zusammenhang mit dem Ersten Halbband von Martin Rangs Werk "Handbuch für den biblischen Unterricht"' (Hermannstadt [Rumania]: June 1940), 1-8. BA Koblenz NL 252.20.
39. Pastor Andreas Scheiner, 'Bericht über die gründende Tagung der Arbeitsgemeinschaft des Institutes zur Erforschung des jüdischen Einflusses auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben in der evangelischen Landeskirche A.B. in Rumänien am 4 und 5 März 1942 in Hermannstadt'. BA Koblenz NL 252/20.
40. Copy, Krüger, SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Polizei to Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, 22 February 1943, Krakau. BA Koblenz R59/65/fiche 1/29.
41. Dr Wolfrum, SS-Obersturmführer, to the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 29 March 1944, 'Betrifft: Einsatz von evangelischen Geistlichen aus Rumänien zur seelsorgerischen Betreuung Volksdeutscher im Generalgouvernement'. BA Koblenz R59/65/fiche 1/32.

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