

The Politics of Religion in Indonesia

Syncretism, orthodoxy, and religious
contention in Java and Bali

**Edited by
Michel Picard and Rémy Madinier**

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

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Introduction

'Agama', 'adat', and Pancasila


Michel Picard

In the past few decades, consistent criticism has been levelled against the prevalent assumption of the religious studies discourse – the universality of religion as a distinct domain of human societies. Instead of being a universal and *sui generis* phenomenon, 'religion' emerged as a specifically Eurocentric category, and a contentious one at that.¹

Indeed, 'religion' is neither a descriptive nor an analytical term but a prescriptive and normative one. Originating in the Roman notion of *religio*, it was appropriated by early Christian theologians, who radically shifted its sense and reference by uprooting it from its 'pagan' framework (Sachot 2007). To the Romans, *religio* was what *traditio* is all about, a set of ancestral practices developed by a people and transmitted over generations.² As there are different peoples, so are there different traditions. As a set of practices, the predicates 'true' and 'false' are not applicable to a tradition. By claiming to be the true *religio*, Christianity counterposed its doctrines to the prevalent practices, rejected as a set of false beliefs. This distinction between true and false religions marks a semantic shift characterized by a scriptural turn, a substitution of text for ritual, of orthodoxy (allegiance to a normative doctrine) for orthopraxy (respect for ancestral rites) (Assmann 2003).

Generalized in a secular garb by post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment thinkers, the Christian conception of 'religion' became a scholarly construct with the development of the so-called 'science of religion' (*Religionswissenschaft*) (Sharpe 1986). What is at issue, as a result, is the fact that the category 'religion' is too imbued with Christian theological concepts and values, as well as with Western modernity, to have a cross-cultural or a transhistorical relevance. Consequently, 'religion' – just like other folk categories such as *din*, *mana*, *tao*, *dharma*, *bhakti* or *agama* – should not be taken for a conceptual tool, but ought to be the object of analysis (Saler 1993).

Whereas 'religion' is a category to its own participants in the Western context, in other contexts, it is a category constructed by the observer from a variety of practices which the actors do not necessarily combine into a coherent institution and for which they usually do not possess a corresponding word (Cohn 1969). However, the fact that 'religion' is 'a category imposed from the outside on some aspect of native culture' (Smith 1998: 269) does not



Map 1 Map of Indonesia (courtesy Ade Pristie Wayho, Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, Jakarta)

imply that it is 'solely the creation of the scholar's study' (Smith 1982: xi), since members of other cultures have appropriated the word 'religion' – or its local equivalent(s) – to define some of their practices as differentiated from others.

The colonial encounter with other peoples gave rise to the extension of the category 'religion' from a very specific meaning located in Christian revealed Truth to a generic concept with universal applicability (Fitzgerald 2007). For centuries, Europeans had a conventional ordering for categorizing the peoples of the world. They recognized 'Christians', 'Jews', 'Mohammedans', and 'heathens', rather than different religions. This convention declined during the nineteenth century, to be replaced by a list of 'world religions' that could be compared with one another as particular instances of the universal genus 'religion' (Masuzawa 2005). The common assumption of Western scholars was that these world religions must have essential similarities to Christianity in terms of which they were assessed: they were expected to have formal structures of fixed doctrines, resting on canonical authority, be enforced by a priestly hierarchy, and sustained by congregational worship. In that sense, world religions were considered 'advanced' religions, as opposed to more localized religions, regarded as 'primitive' or 'animist'.

The spread of world religions in the nineteenth century resulted in the formalizing of the rites and tenets of Asian traditions into something resembling the belief systems and institutional structures of Abrahamic religions, bringing forth such entities as Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Shinto, and so on. Reformers emphasized the rational and doctrinal elements in their religious inheritance, condemning blind superstition, mindless priesthood, and backward customs. By substituting orthodoxy for orthopraxy, these reform movements attempted to discriminate between true religion and mere tradition. As they expanded their global reach, these normative forms of belief demarcated their boundaries and consolidated their corporate identity, while endeavouring to control the variegated rituals and observances which they encountered. Such a process of 'religionization' resulted in a complex evolution, marked by rationalization – the formulation of a canonical corpus, its institutionalization and its effective socialization (Hefner 1993) – as well as by secularization – desacralization of the immanent concrete in favour of an abstract and transcendent divine (Hefner 1998) – along with scripturalization and standardized practices.

Thus, if it is indeed true that 'religion' is not a native category, one has to acknowledge that it has become the case on account of the colonial encounter and the broader Western influence across the world, which induced the native interlocutors of colonial administrators, Orientalists and missionaries to invent for themselves the idea that they too had a proper 'religion'. The result being that, nowadays, religion scholars study peoples who consider themselves to 'have a religion'. What remains then to be studied is the dialogic process by which Western representations of non-Christian 'religions' are being negotiated, adopted or opposed, by members of non-Western cultures.

As a category, 'religion' is a classificatory device, which has to do with the construction and maintenance of boundaries. Accordingly, one should pay attention to the practical work that the use of 'religion' as a taxonomy accomplishes, that is, both what it includes and what it excludes (Asad 2001). Specifically, one has to be aware that what counts as 'religion' for the observer might not correspond to what local actors themselves consider to pertain to their 'religion'. Furthermore, these local actors do not necessarily concur regarding what their 'religion' is about, as 'religion' is a contested matter, having to do with institutionalized values and their relation to power and its legitimization. Consequently, one should elucidate what is identified and legitimized as 'religion', by whom, for what purpose, in which circumstances and under which political conditions. In this perspective, the relevant question is no longer 'What is religion?' but 'What gets to count as religion and why?' (McCutcheon 2004).

In Indonesia, the category 'religion' has been appropriated in terms of 'agama'. Many, if not most, Indonesianists appear to take for granted that *agama* is but a word-for-word translation of 'religion'. However, things are not so straightforward, as *agama* covers a much narrower semantic field than 'religion' does, for which Indonesians had to borrow the Dutch loanword *religi*. In truth, *agama* is the peculiar combination in Sanskrit guise of a Christian view of what counts as a world religion with an Islamic understanding of what defines a proper religion: divine revelation recorded by a prophet in a holy book, a system of law for the community of believers, congregational worship, and a belief in the One and Only God.³ In this respect, *agama* is a point of contention between different sets of actors. Moreover, far from being autonomous, *agama* is an integral part of a semantic field which it composes along with the categories *adat* ('tradition'), *budaya* ('culture'), *hukum* ('law'), and various signifiers involving political authority.

Agama, from India to Indonesia

In his study of Sanskrit in Indonesia, Jan Gonda has this to say about the appropriation of *agama*⁴ in the Archipelago:

In Sanskrit *agama*, apart from other use, designates 'a traditional precept, doctrine, body of precepts, collection of such doctrines'; in short, 'anything handed down as fixed by tradition'; it is, moreover, the name of a class of works inculcating the so-called tantric worship of Shiva and Shakti. In Old Javanese it could apply to a body of customary law or a Dharma-book, and to religious or moral traditions, and the words *sang hyang* 'the divine, holy' often preceding it emphasize its superhuman character. The term is, moreover, used to signify the religious knowledge of a brahman ..., and also that of a high Buddhist functionary. Islam, in the spread of which many compatriots of Shivaists and Buddhists who had led the way into the Archipelago took an important part, adopted

the term, and so did, in the course of time, Christianity. Nowadays *agama* ... is in Javanese, Malay etc. 'religion'.

(1973: 499–500)

Surprisingly few authors appear to have wondered how a Sanskrit loanword so laden with Indic references could have come to designate an Islamic conception of what 'religion' is about. One of them is Jane Atkinson (1987: 174–8), who has attempted to trace the historical development of the term *agama* into what she called the 'Indonesian civil religion'. However, she did not specify why it is precisely the word *agama* that came to stand for 'religion' in Indonesia. That fact was attributed by Judith Becker to the paramount importance in medieval Java and Bali of the *Shaivagama*, the sacred scriptures of the Shaiva-Siddhanta order in South India (Becker 2004: 16; see also Brunner nd).⁵ Yet, this still leaves many questions unanswered, since in Shaiva-Siddhanta *agama* does not signify 'religion', a notion which in any case was actually unknown to the Indian world before the nineteenth century.

We are on firmer ground if we turn to the 'legal' acceptance taken on by the word *agama* in Old Javanese. On that subject, we can refer to Javanese and Balinese textual traditions bearing the generic title *Agama*, a term 'used to refer to a range of texts dealing with moral, religious and legal sanctions and practices' (Creese 2009: 242, note 2; see also Hoadley and Hooker 1981, 1986). These texts are principally drawn from the Sanskrit *Manava Dharmashastra*, the 'Laws of Manu', interpreted and adapted to suit indigenous needs. The basic premise of Hindu law is in the idea of *dharma*, which pertains both to the natural order of the cosmos and to the duties and privileges bearing on the individual according to his status (*varna*) and stage of life (*ashrama*) – the *varnashramadharma*.

This is also how the Bengali historian Himansu Bhusan Sarkar interpreted the word *agama* in his study of *Indian Influences on the Literature of Java and Bali*, published by the Greater India Society (Sarkar 1934). His chapter on 'The Agama or Dharmashastras of Indonesia' is divided into two headings, the *Niti* literature, which expounds ethics and religious ideals, and jurisprudence. He deemed significant that the Indian term *Agama*, which refers to a *Shastra* handed down by the gods, has been retained in the Javanese and Balinese law codes, which are predicated on the fiction of a divinely ordained set of rules, with Shiva featuring prominently as the proponent of their authority.

This is precisely the taxonomy that had been adopted by Balinese literati when the Dutch colonial government opened in 1928 a foundation dedicated to the collection and study of the Balinese manuscripts – the Kirtya Liefkrink-van der Tuuk. In the catalogue of the Kirtya library, *Agama* refers to legal and political literature, corresponding to the Indian *Dharmashastra* and *Nitisastra* (Kadjeng 1929). The most important of these texts (*Adi-agama*, *Agama*, *Purwa Agama*, and *Kutara Agama*) were translated into Balinese and

Malay at the behest of the colonial government, in order to be used as legal foundation by the courts of justice established in each of the former Balinese kingdoms.

Thus, we see that in Bali the word *agama* has retained a sense equivalent to that of *dharma* until well into the twentieth century. In India itself, a shift in the meaning of the word *dharma* had taken place among the educated Bengali elites early in the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the missionary activities and the European presence. According to Wilhelm Halbfass:

The self-definition of Hinduism as a 'religion', as a *dharma* which confronts and asserts itself against the *dharma* of the Christians, and more generally the use of *dharma* as an analogue or answer to 'religion', is largely due to the fact that the missionaries in Bengal laid claim to the concept and term *dharma*, using it to proclaim Christianity as the 'true *dharma*' (*satyadharma*). In contrast, the use of the Islamic concept of religion *din* as an Arabic-Persian analogue to *dharma* had no comparable consequences.

(1988: 340)

In these trying circumstances, the Hindu *dharma* became one religion among others, and it could thereafter be compared and opposed to the Muslim *dharma* or the Christian *dharma*.

We can surmise that, in the manner of what occurred to the notion of *dharma* in India, the 'legal' and 'religious' components of *agama* became dissociated in Indonesia when, through its adoption by Islam and later on by Christianity, *agama* took on the meaning of 'religion'. By appropriating this term, proponents of both these faiths had added new acceptations to it, namely a belief in one almighty God and the requirement of conversion to a foreign doctrine whose teachings are contained in a holy book. Subsequently, a sharp distinction was drawn between 'heathens' and 'true believers'. During the later period of Dutch colonial rule, *agama* became associated further with an ideal of social progress, while 'pagan' beliefs were scorned as superstitions and viewed as a cause for shame.

By taking on the meaning of 'religion', *agama* was not only dissociated from 'law' but also from 'tradition', which was one of its original senses in Sanskrit. In contemporary Indonesia, the notion of 'tradition' is glossed as *adat*, an Arabic loanword commonly translated as 'custom'. Yet such rendering does not do justice to the importance of *adat* for Indonesian traditional societies, which is aptly conveyed by Hans Schärer regarding the Ngaju in Borneo: '[*Adat*] certainly means more than simply usage, custom, habit ... the notion has a double meaning. Firstly, that of divine cosmic order and harmony, and secondly, that of life and actions in agreement with this order' (Schärer 1963: 74). In this respect, the meaning of *adat* comes close to that of *dharma*, being both a description of the world and a norm on which to base social life.

This scope, simultaneously cosmic and social, of *adat* was fragmented by being subjected to a series of reductions. First of all by Islam, followed in this respect by Christianity, which endeavoured to curtail the religious dimension of *adat* by confining its significance to the customs and traditions of a people (*adat kebiasaan*). Specifically, the word *adat* entered the language of Islamized populations in the Indonesian Archipelago to refer to indigenous 'customary law' as opposed to Islamic 'religious law' (*hukum, sharia*). Subsequently, Dutch administrators codified the indigenous customary law (*adatrecht*) of the various peoples on whom they had imposed their colonial empire.

This is how *adat* and *agama* have come to mutually define each other in contemporary Indonesia, each category being continually redefined through the process of their interaction.⁶ Whereas formerly the semantic field of *agama* overlapped with what Indonesians have come to label *adat*, today 'religion' tends to be countered to 'tradition' – particularly so in those societies which have been Islamized or Christianized.⁷ The historical emergence of the category *agama* and its interpretation as 'religion' thus amounts to its differentiation from the category *adat*. This is to say that it is only by looking at these categories in relation, rather than assuming their autonomy, that their respective fields can be adequately circumscribed and analysed.

Now, it has often been remarked that Indonesian traditional societies had no word that could be translated as 'religion'. It is then usually claimed that traditional beliefs and practices were subsumed under the word *adat* or one of its cognates. However, *adat* should not be seen as a pristine tradition originating with a distant and indigenous past, as the fact that its very name is an Arabic loanword indicates. Moreover, it is this same term which is used elsewhere in the Muslim world to refer to customs that have no explicit Islamic legitimation (Bruinessen 1999: 167). That being so, and since they mutually define each other, neither *adat* nor *agama* have had constant and independent meanings, as these categories appear to have evolved jointly.

In Indonesian traditional societies, there is no separation between religion and ethnicity, no differentiation between a religious and a secular sphere of experience. No clear-cut distinction is made between the natural and the social worlds, the human and the non-human, the transcendental and the immanent. The main purpose of the rites is to maintain the proper connections between people, the natural world, and the world of the spirits and ancestors, on which equilibrium the well-being of community and cosmos depends. Unlike the religions based on revelation, that are exclusivist, the so-called indigenous religions are not singled out as 'religions', as a bounded field that could be demarcated from other aspects of life in society. Julia Howell renders the situation in a most appropriate fashion:

Irrespective of similarities and differences in cosmological constructs, indigenous Indonesian religious traditions display great uniformity in their perceived relationship to social life as a whole. The indigenous traditions are community religions, in the sense that participation in them

comes as a consequence of membership in a local community, usually acquired at birth. Further, participation in the indigenous cults is seen by the communities practicing them as part of the members' obligations within the system of local customary law. It could equally well be said that customary law is established upon the foundation of indigenous cosmology and exists to maintain the proper order of the universe. (1982: 505)

This is to say that, in such indigenous traditions, there is no clear-cut demarcation between what would eventually be denoted as *adat* and *agama* respectively. This state of affairs would be challenged by three foreign religious traditions: Hindu-Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian.

Indianization

Hinduism and Buddhism⁸ came in the wake of the expanding long-distance trade that linked the Indonesian Archipelago to India and China starting in the first centuries BC. The manner in which Indian religious traditions happened to inform the life of the peoples of Java and Bali is still being debated by specialists. There have been several prevalent theories of the so-called 'Indianization' of Southeast Asia, depending on which method of transmission (colonization, trade, charisma) or which mediators (*kshatriya, vaishya, brahmana*) were thought to play the leading role (Lukas 2003: 1–6).

In view of our increasing knowledge of the material culture and maritime trade relations between the societies on both sides of the Bay of Bengal during the first millennium CE, we now realize that the Indianization of Southeast Asia was concurrent with, and no different from, the Indianization of South Asia itself (Heesterman 1989; Kulke 1990). This is exemplified by the diffusion of Sanskrit, which emerged as a public language after the beginning of the common era almost simultaneously and in very similar ways in the Indian subcontinent and in Southeast Asia, creating a transcultural symbolic network which Sheldon Pollock (1996) has named the 'Sanskrit cosmopolis'.

What was transmitted, imitated and borrowed throughout the Sanskrit cosmopolis was a scriptural tradition, which carried over a new world-view wherein authority and its legitimation were no longer based on the local community and its ancestral observances. However, Sanskrit terms and concepts had to be appropriated in order to make sense locally. In this process, as Craig Reynolds reminds us:

[Sanskrit loanwords] did not just rename existing categories, although they were often admitted into local languages precisely because they did this and thus elevated the status of existing categories. They also wedged themselves into the structure of local languages and created new spaces, new relationships. (1995: 433)

This is precisely what occurred with the 'localization' (Wolters 1999: 55) in the Indonesian Archipelago of the word *agama*, which, as we have seen, refers to revealed scriptural knowledge.

When we look at the Indianization of Java and Bali as a transcultural movement of ideas conveyed by Sanskrit texts rather than as a movement of people, the appropriation of Indic traditions by the Javanese and the Balinese comes across as a voluntary project, that is, the selective adoption by local elites of a new world-view that involved a redefinition of the relationship of the social sphere to the cosmos (Lansing 1983). These Indic traditions blended with local usages to such a degree that it is difficult to determine whether certain features are Indonesian under Indian garb or Indian transformed by Indonesian vernacularization.⁹

Islamization

It has long been customary in the academic milieu to view Islam in Java as a superficial veneer, underneath which endured a syncretic indigenous and Hindu-Buddhist heritage. This prejudice has been denounced from different quarters,¹⁰ and a more balanced vision emerged recently with the historiographic work of Merle Ricklefs. He construes the Islamization of Java as an alternance of conflict and accommodation between competing identities, Javanese and Islamic, leading to a 'mystic synthesis', which by the turn of the nineteenth century combined a commitment to Islamic identity, observation of the five pillars of the faith, and acceptance of local spiritual powers, all within the context of Sufism (Ricklefs 2006).

The fact that the kind of Islam brought to Java was predominantly of Sufi persuasion, conveyed by Indian traders strongly imbued with Hinduism, presumably eased the transition from mystical Hindu-Buddhism to mystical Islam. Accordingly, one might surmise that, at first, the adoption of Islam might not have precipitated any significant disruption in the life and world-view of the Javanese, for whom the new faith may have been regarded as a means of tapping yet another source of mystical power (Bruinessen 1999: 162). Unlike Indic ideas, however, Islam provided an exclusive path to salvation which required the imposition of religious boundaries and the rejection of former ways, amounting to a change of ethnic status. In the words of Anthony Reid, 'the new scriptural ideas came to be seen as "religion" (*agama*) and the old pattern as "custom" (*adat*)' (1993: 164).

In this perspective, the history of the Islamization of Java – which was simultaneously the Javanization of Islam – should be understood as the outcome of a tension between the universalist vocation of Islam and the civilizing claims of 'Javanism' (*kejawen*), manifested in rites, mystical speculations, ethical norms, aesthetic standards, and a strict socio-linguistic etiquette.¹¹ Such a tension expressed itself through the socio-cultural polarity between two religious traditions: on the one hand, the Javanese who attempted to enforce a strict conformity to the ritual and legal prescriptions of Islam, and on the

other, those for whom Islam ought to merge into the Javanese civilization and to comply with its values.

In the course of the nineteenth century, the competing ambitions of Dutch colonialism and Islamic revivalism would challenge the Javanese mystic synthesis (Ricklefs 2007). From then on, one observes a widening cleavage between syncretist and anti-syncretist versions of Islam, manifested in a conflict between on the one hand, the returned pilgrims from Mecca (*haji*), eager to foster a more zealous sense of an Islamic identity among the Javanese, and on the other hand, established religious teachers (*kiai*) and masters of Sufi orders (*tarekat*), whose teachings conveyed an eclectic or esoteric view of Islam.

As a reaction to reformist pressures, there emerged, aside from the community of firm believers – the *puihian* (literally, 'the white ones') or *santri* (graduates from the Islamic boarding schools, the *pesantren*) – a category of Javanese who were accused by the latter of not being proper Muslims, the *abangan* (literally, 'the red ones'). According to Ricklefs (2007), these nominal Muslims, who formed the majority of Javanese, began to distance themselves from their Islamic identity and were abandoning the observation of the five pillars, focusing instead on the propitiation of local spiritual powers. As for the Javanese bureaucratic elite, the *priyayi*, faced with the decline of their status and authority and confronted with the hostility of Islamic teachers, they were being detached from their own people as they became ever more incorporated into the colonial bureaucracy. Some of them started questioning their Islamic identity and embraced European modernity, all the while looking back towards their Hindu-Buddhist glorious heritage.

While Javanese society was becoming polarized, the colonial authorities were seeking to impede the propagation of Islam in the Archipelago. Despite their vigilance, though, Islam was to play a major role in the development of Indonesian nationalism. Already in the nineteenth century, Islam had served as a rallying banner to anticolonial revolts, providing a common bond among natives, based on their belonging to the community of true believers (*umat*), which opposed them to their Christian overlords. With the rise of the nationalist movement in the twentieth century, the polarization of Javanese society into *abangan* and *puihian* intensified and became politicized.

As for Bali, it has been commonly depicted since the nineteenth century as an island of Hinduism in a sea of Islam, as if Balinese identity had been formed through opposition to Islam. In truth, the existence of Islam is almost as old in Bali as it is in Java, having followed the trade route along the north coast of the island that connected Java to the eastern Spice Islands. From the sixteenth century onwards, various Muslim communities settled on the island's coastal fringe. With the incorporation of Bali into the Dutch East Indies, at the turn of the twentieth century, came the first Muslim agents of the colonial administration, which transformed both the geography and the demography of Islam on the island. However, until the end of the colonial period, the relations between Bali and Islam had more to do with politics than with religion.¹²

Christianization

The establishment of Christianity in the Archipelago began in the sixteenth century with the Catholic evangelization of the Spice Islands by Portuguese missionaries. When the Dutch supplanted the Portuguese in the region in the seventeenth century, Catholics were forcibly converted to Protestantism and all Catholic missions were banned until the turn of the nineteenth century. Yet, unlike the missionizing Portuguese, on the whole, the Governors-General of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) were not concerned with propagating their religious persuasion among the native populations of the Archipelago.

In the nineteenth century, some Dutch colonial administrators nurtured optimistic expectations of eliminating the pernicious influence of Islam by Christianizing the Indonesians. By and large though, the Dutch government looked upon the presence of missions in the Indies with ambivalence. On the one hand, European mission societies were permitted to proselytize non-Muslim populations, as a means to curb the advance of Islamization. On the other hand, Christian proselytization remained forbidden in Muslim areas, for fear of arousing anticolonial reactions.

Java was eventually opened to Christian missions in the mid-nineteenth century, and even then under watchful administrative eyes (Hefner 1993). The progress of Christianization was a protracted and uneven affair. Whereas Dutch mission societies won very few converts, Indo-European and Javanese proselytizers in the rural areas were more successful as, unlike their Dutch counterparts, they did not expect the new converts to give up their Javanese-ness. For quite some time, Christianity was perceived and received as a new form of esoteric knowledge (*ngelmu*). Until the second half of the nineteenth century, neither Christian nor Muslim Javanese had yet developed an orthodoxy with which to assess each other's religion, as both Christianity and Islam were intermingled with Javanism. Later on, Javanese Christianity would become closer to Dutch Christianity, while Javanese Islam was becoming closer to Middle Eastern Islam. Both religions were moving toward a normative orthodoxy, thereby defining exclusive boundaries around each community of true believers. With the increasing influence of religious orthodoxy among the believers, relations between Muslim and Christian Javanese became more apologetic and confrontational.

Although a latecomer on the scene, the Catholic Church made decisive headway, owing to its more considerate approach to Javanese sensitivities. Be that as it may, at the end of the colonial period, Christian converts formed only a tiny minority of the Javanese population, a minority, however, which on the whole was better educated for having benefited from mission schooling.

Following an aborted attempt at Christianization in the late nineteenth century, Bali remained closed to Christianity until the 1930s, when the evangelizing activities of a Protestant mission among the Balinese sparked a heated controversy. The dispute was initiated by F.D.K. Bosch, head of the Archeology Department of Batavia, and pursued by the language official

Roelof Goris (1933), who opposed the missions on the ground that in Bali religion and social order form an inseparable whole. Therefore, by deliberately assaulting the religion of the Balinese, missionary work would bring about the collapse of their entire culture.

These arguments were disputed by the Protestant missionary Hendrik Kraemer (1933), who rejected the identification of religion with culture. He asserted that Balinese religion demonstrated only a thin veneer of Hinduism and was permeated by magic and superstitions common to other 'animist' traditions in the Archipelago. Furthermore, the island was being subjected to increasing foreign influence, such as government, education and tourism, to the extent that Balinese religion – far from experiencing a revival from within, as the Orientalists were prone to claim – was doomed to disappear under the assaults of modern secularization. In the end, the Orientalists won the day and the Governor-General forbade missionary work in Bali. But this did not prevent the missions, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, from progressively setting foot on the island and converting a few thousand Balinese.

The post-1945 independence of Indonesia and Pancasila

Soon after the Dutch surrender, in March 1942, the Japanese occupation authorities endeavoured to win over the Indonesian Muslim community in a propaganda campaign aimed at arousing anti-Western sentiments on the basis of defence of Islam (Benda 1958). With this aim in mind, they established an Office for Religious Affairs (*Kantor Urusan Agama*), and a year later they regrouped all existing Muslim organizations in a Consultative Congress of Indonesian Muslims (*Masyumi*). By the time the capitulation of Japan was near at hand, the *Masyumi*'s leaders, comforted by a new sense of their importance, were convinced that Islam would be the official religion of an independent Indonesia.

In April 1945, the Japanese set up an Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence, which rapidly came up against the question of the foundation of the future Indonesian state, pitting the 'Islamic group' (*golongan Islam*) against the 'nationalist group' (*golongan kebangsaan*). The former, confident that they represented an overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people, wanted to establish an Islamic state, whereas their opponents, concerned that such a decision would alienate the Christians and other religious minorities (not to mention the nominal Muslims), argued in favour of a state in which religious and secular affairs would be kept separate. In June, Sukarno attempted to overcome the deadlock by outlining the five basic principles – the Pancasila – that were to serve as the foundations of the Indonesian state, which would neither be a theocratic nor a secular state. The fifth principle was 'Belief in God' (*Ketuhanan*).¹³ According to Sukarno, Indonesian citizens would be free to profess the religion of their choice, no religion being granted an official, or even a privileged, status, not even Islam, notwithstanding its dominant position in the country.

Sukarno's proposition was not accepted by the Islamic group, who wanted to include a clause in the Constitution stating that 'the religion of Indonesia is Islam'. The confrontation was finally resolved when leaders of each group agreed on a compromise known as the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*), that was to become the preamble to the Constitution. The formulation of this charter bore the mark of the Islamic group. To begin with, the order of Sukarno's five principles was reversed: 'Belief in God' was now first among the founding principles, to which the other four were subordinated. And then, to this first principle was extended a clause – referred thereafter as the 'seven words' – which read: 'with the obligation for the adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law' (*dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*) (Boland 1982: 23–6).

After the proclamation of independence on 17 August 1945, a new Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia was convened to draft a Constitution. Owing to the opposition of the nationalist group, the contentious 'seven words' were eventually removed from the preamble, while on the other hand, the expression 'Belief in God' (*Ketuhanan*) became 'Belief in the One and Only God' (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*). In the end, Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution read as follows:

- (1) The State is based upon the belief in the One and Only God. (2) The State guarantees the freedom of each inhabitant to embrace his or her respective religion and to worship according to his or her religion and belief.

The omission of the 'seven words' would become a bone of contention for decades to come, with repeated attempts on the part of Islamic parties to have the Jakarta Charter reinserted in the Constitution. Moreover, Article 29 contained several ambiguities which were bound to engender further dissent. First, it did not explicitly delineate the relationship between religion and the state. Second, it did not specify what qualified as *agama*, that is, which religions fostered the belief in the One and Only God, and hence were included under the protection of Pancasila. Above all, the interpretation of the notion of 'belief' (*kepercayaan*) and the way it related to 'religion' (*agama*) was to be the cause of much controversy. Should *kepercayaan* be construed as a mere semantic appendage to *agama* or else as a distinct and autonomous category? And in the latter case, was *kepercayaan* put on an equal footing with *agama* by the Constitution, allowing Indonesians the choice between one or the other option? Needless to say, opinions on the matter diverged widely: if for the Islamic group the Constitution only recognized *agama*, for the nationalist group it distinguished *agama* from *kepercayaan* and recognized the legitimacy of both.

Be that as it may, as a concession to the Islamic group, a Ministry of Religion (*Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia*, KAGRI, later to be renamed *Departemen Agama*) was established in January 1946. Initially set up to advance Muslim interests, the Ministry of Religion was expanded from the

start to include separate sections for Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, thereby acknowledging Christianity as a legitimate religion of the Book (Boland 1982: 105–12). Whereas the Ministry of Religion was controlled by *santri* Muslims, who attempted to use it in order to bring Javanese *abangan* to commit more strictly to Islam, the Ministry of Education and Culture became a Javanist stronghold.

In order to grasp the meaning and import of 'religion' in independent Indonesia, one needs to investigate what has been included in – and what has been excluded from – the normative status of *agama*. While the Constitution guaranteed the Indonesian citizens the freedom to profess and to practise their own religion, the Ministry of Religion endeavoured to restrict the legal acceptance of acknowledged religions, in conformity with the Islamic view of what qualifies as a legitimate *agama* – that is, an understanding of religion as exclusivist, congregational, scripturalist and universalist (Howell 2005). So much so that, even if Islam failed to establish itself as the official religion of Indonesia, its proponents succeeded in imposing their own conception of the relations between religion and the state, by framing and shaping all the debates about religion. Thus, from 1952 on, the Ministry of Religion made a number of attempts to establish a legal definition of religion. According to the Ministry, in order to be recognized, a religion must be revealed by God, possess a prophet and a holy book, have a codified system of law for its followers, and further, it should enjoy international recognition and not be limited to a single ethnic group.

Such a restrictive definition excluded several categories from the status of *agama*: religious traditions of non-Muslim and non-Christian ethnic groups, such as the Balinese and Indonesian Chinese, on the one hand, and on the other, Javanese *abangan* and mystical groups holding heterodox views, as well as so-called syncretic 'new religions' (*agama baru*), inspired by self-proclaimed prophets. All these groups were regarded as 'people who do not yet have a religion' (*orang yang belum beragama*), a label associated with primitive backwardness and parochialism. Whereas adherents of ethnic religions were targeted for missionizing, whether by Muslims or by Christians, on the other hand, *abangan*, adherents of mystical groups and followers of new religions – subsumed by the Ministry of Religion under the heading *aliran kepercayaan* (literally, 'streams of belief') – were pressed to 'return into the fold of their mother religion' (*kembali ke agama induknya*), that is, Islam.

The emergence in the early twentieth century of mystical movements in Java and their dissociation from Islam are an outcome of the breakdown of the Javanese mystic synthesis. These movements are part and parcel of a Javanist cultural revivalism, a riposte to the Muslim reformists who repudiated the mystic strand of Islam. Mystically inclined Javanist intellectuals increasingly combined elements of their Hindu-Buddhist heritage with Sufism, Christianity and Theosophy.¹⁴ The overall designation for Javanese mysticism is *kebatinan*, a term derived from Sufi traditions, which conventionally contrast the 'outer' (*lahir*) and 'inner' (*batin*) dimensions of religious experience.

Kebatinan is thus the 'science of the inner being', in the sense that its adepts search for the experience of the divine in their inner self. While groupings of spiritual seekers around a teacher had been a familiar sight in Java for a long time, *kebatinan* groups grew in numbers during the early years of independence and became organized into formal movements that outlived their founders.

In 1955, the *kebatinan* groups formed a coordinating body, the *Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia* (BKKI). Over subsequent years, the BKKI held several congresses and petitioned Sukarno to request a status equal to *agama* for *kebatinan*. Despite these efforts, however, *kebatinan* was not included in the religions listed in Sukarno's Presidential Decree No. 1 of January 1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Blasphemy of Religions,¹⁵ which specified what is meant by *agama* in the Constitution, namely, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.

The Balinese were more successful. After Indonesia's proclamation of independence, they were greatly vexed when they realized that their religion was not considered a proper *agama* but was classified as an *aliran kepercayaan* by the Ministry of Religion. Consequently, if they did not want to become the target of Muslim or Christian proselytizing, the Balinese had to reform their religion in order for it to be considered eligible for the status of *agama*. For this to happen, though, Balinese religion had to be rationalized and redefined in transcendent and monotheistic terms so as to approximate the features of a religion of the Book. The first question to be settled was for them to agree on the name of their religion. After lengthy internal debates, they finally came to an agreement in 1952 to call their religion *Agama Hindu Bali*. But it took them several years of lobbying before the *Agama Hindu Bali* would finally be included in the Ministry of Religion, in 1958. While the name *Hindu Bali* implied a recognition of the distinctive ethnic component of the Balinese Hindu religion, it would be replaced in the early 1960s by the more inclusive name *Agama Hindu*.¹⁶

The 'New Order' regime and the resurgence of Islam

In the aftermath of the 'coup' events of September–October 1965, the army, with a helping hand of *santri* Muslims, eradicated 'atheistic communism', resulting in the massive slaughter of *abangan*. Numerous *kebatinan* groups were dissolved, as they were suspected of being infiltrated by communists. Pancasila acquired further prominence as a state ideology, as President Suharto relied on religion to confront the spectre of communism as well as to strengthen his control over the population. Atheism was prohibited and all Indonesian citizens were obliged to be affiliated with one of the recognized religions, mentioned on their identity card. In 1969, Sukarno's Decree on the Prevention of Blasphemy was converted into law (UU No. 5, 1969). This had the result of turning state-sanctioned religions into mutually exclusive categories, putting increasing pressure on heterodox views to conform.

Muslim parties, which had been instrumental in fighting communism and bringing Suharto into power, thought that their time had come and pressed to have the Jakarta Charter inscribed in the Constitution. But they were quickly disabused, as Suharto appeared to share Sukarno's deep suspicion of political Islam. On the whole, the administration of Islam under the New Order aimed at accommodating the religious aspirations of the Muslim community while preventing the Islamic parties from meddling in public affairs. By depoliticizing Islam, this policy was to end in Islamizing Indonesian society, specifically at the expense of Javanism.

Yet, at the time, the obligation for Indonesians to be affiliated with one of the state-sanctioned religions did not benefit Islam, as in their quest for protection numerous *abangan* chose to repudiate Islam outright, opting instead for Protestantism or Catholicism, as well as, to a lesser extent, for Hinduism or Buddhism. Moreover, in the late 1960s, *kebatinan* groups received the backing of an influential faction of the political and military elite, deeply rooted in a Javanist cultural background. In 1970, the former BKKI was revived under the aegis of the government party Golkar as the BK51 (*Badan Kongres Kepercayaan Kejiwaan Kerohanian Kebatinan Indonesia*). The same year, the BK51 became the Coordinating Secretariat of Beliefs (*Sekretariat Kerjasama Kepercayaan*, SKK), and was formally incorporated into Golkar.

Thus, one notices a shift in vocabulary. The terms *kejiwaan* (from *jiwa*, 'soul') and *kerohanian* (from *rohi*, 'spirit') made their appearance next to *kebatinan*, all these terms being eventually subsumed under the heading *kepercayaan* ('beliefs') (Subagya 1976). This shift points to a normalization of Javanese mysticism, a move away from *kejawen*, with its deprecatory connotation of superstition, magic and occultism, and closer to a monotheistic orientation, with *aliran kepercayaan* copying proper *agama* in having an explicit set of doctrines and congregational structure. By the same token, mystical groups reiterated their claim that the constitutional position of *kepercayaan* should be acknowledged on a par with that of *agama*. Their demand appeared to be granted in 1973, when the new Outlines of State Policy (*Garis Besar Haluan Negara*, GBHN) formulated by the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR) formally declared *kepercayaan* and *agama* as equally legitimate expressions of the 'Belief in the One and Only God' (Subagya 1976: 125).

Even though the MPR had fallen short of recognizing mysticism as a religion, Islamic milieus put intense pressure on the government to make sure that this would never happen. Consequently, at the time of its following session, in 1978, the MPR specified that 'Belief in the One and Only God is not a religion' (*Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa tidak merupakan agama*). From then on, the *aliran kepercayaan* would no longer come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religion, but would be placed in the Ministry of Education and Culture, where a new directorate was established within the Directorate General of Culture – the 'Directorate for the Supervision of the Followers of Belief in the One and Only God' (*Direktorat*

Pembinaan Penghayat Kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa). Thus, failing to be recognized as 'religion', 'beliefs' have been acknowledged as 'culture', providing *kebatinan* with an institutional shelter. Yet, this shelter came at a price. While hitherto it could appear that affiliation to a *kebatinan* group was almost as good as professing a recognized religion, now the government position was plainly that such an affiliation did not provide Indonesian citizens with proper religious membership.

In 1978, the Ministry of Religion issued a set of decrees forbidding any proselytism among the populations already professing, however nominally, a recognized religion, with the aim of preventing the evangelization of *abangan*. At the same time, the Ministry launched faith propagation campaigns (*dakwah*), with the intention of winning back the Javanese who had converted to Christianity, as well as to Hinduism or Buddhism, after the bloodbath which had marked the onset of the New Order. And the fact is that, from then on, the Islamization of Java, and of Indonesia as a whole, would start off anew, together with the Islamic world revival.

For the time being, however, this resurgence of Islam would be thwarted in the political arena by the government. During its 1978 session, the MPR approved a decree entitled 'The Guide to the Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila' (*Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila*), which worked toward propagating the New Order interpretation of Pancasila through ideological education courses. Then, in a move aimed at bringing political Islam to heel, a law was passed in 1985, requiring that all political parties and social organizations adopt Pancasila as their one and only ideological guiding principle – their 'sole foundation' (*asas tunggal*).

Strong opposition to the *asas tunggal* legislation came not only from Muslim quarters but from Christians as well, who were equally worried that it was a government strategy to promote a secular ideology, by turning Pancasila into a 'civil religion'. In spite of their misgivings, however, all major social, political, and religious organizations eventually adopted Pancasila as their sole foundation. This defeat of 'political' Islam would prove to be a blessing in disguise for 'societal' Islam, prompted as it was by the emergence of a Muslim middle class and a progressive Islamization of daily life. At the same time, the forced acceptance of Pancasila rendered Islam more acceptable, and the government became more responsive to the aspirations of the Muslim community.

In the late 1980s, Suharto's power faced growing challenges from sections of the military, who had heretofore provided his main base of support, and he appeared to court the Muslim community while trying to burnish his own Muslim credentials. This rapprochement between Suharto and Islam culminated in 1990 with the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, ICMI) (Hefner 2000). The increasing prominence of this association and the access of its members to leading government positions attested to a growing importance of Islam within Indonesian politics.

Agama in a time of Reformasi

The resignation of President Suharto in 1998, following a major financial and economic crisis, entailed a substantial political restructuring which brought forth the period known as '*Reformasi*': freedom of speech and of information, freedom to establish political parties and associations, free national elections, and far-reaching administrative decentralization. However, the flowering of the movement for a democratic Indonesia that had brought Suharto down quickly lost momentum, with most of the old establishment remaining in place and consolidating their power via formally democratic elections. By the same token, the façade of social harmony laboriously crafted by the New Order regime was torn down, as lasting resentments and conflicts that had been simmering under a lid of political repression and cultural censorship began to surface in the open. Dissensions regarding issues of ethnicity, religion, race and social class, that hitherto had been repressed, were brought to the fore. Having been discredited by its use as a political instrument under Suharto, the Pancasila state ideology gave way to confrontational identity politics.

The liberalization of the political system brought about a mushrooming of parties of all colours and convictions. The main cleavage opposed parties committed to the national ideology as originally formulated in Pancasila to those that used the discourse of normative Islam as a means for social and political mobilization. New Islamic parties sprang up that asked for a formal endorsement of their religion by the state while seeking to enforce the implementation of its tenets in private and public life. However, this forceful reassertion of political Islam was not sanctioned by the ensuing national elections, and to this day the Indonesian Muslim community appears to be more fragmented than ever, divided between hardliners and democrats, between those holding to an exclusive take on Islam and those inclined to more inclusive views.

In addition, the religious issue remains unsettled, as no consensus has been achieved so far on freedom of religion, while the government appears reluctant to let go of state control over religious matters. Whereas only six religions are officially recognized,¹⁷ the law also states that other religions are not forbidden. Indeed, in 1998, the MPR adopted a new Human Rights Charter which provided for citizens' freedom to practise their religion without specifying any particular religions. Furthermore, during his presidential term, Abdurrahman Wahid declared that state recognition of religions was no longer necessary.

In this respect, Julia Howell claims that the boundaries of Indonesian limited religious pluralism have been stretched in the *Reformasi* period, with a widening choice not only within normative 'religions' but between 'religions' (*agama*) and 'belief' (*kepercayaaan*) as well (Howell 2005). The breakdown of the New Order regime has brought about significant changes in the administration of the *aliran kepercayaan*, which seriously disrupted their supervision.

In 1999, due to a restructuring of the Ministry of Education and Culture, the *aliran kepercayaan* were moved to the newly established Ministry of Culture and Tourism, causing a general loosening in their surveillance. Yet, this opportunity did not benefit the *kebatinan* groups as much as it stimulated the emergence of a whole array of new 'spiritual' groups eluding classification as either *agama* or *kepercayaan*. Howell attributes this flowering of 'spirituality' to changes in patterns of personal religiosity occasioned by the expansion of educated and cosmopolitan middle classes, whose members are increasingly inclined to devotionism and mysticism. Due to the discredit now attached to *kebatinan*, on account of its alleged parochialism and syncretism, Muslims in quest of spiritual experiences are turning to Sufism, which is enjoying a spectacular revival in contemporary Indonesia (Howell 2007).

Yet, at the same time, signs of the radicalization of Indonesian Islam are on the increase. To begin with, the Jakarta Charter has made a remarkable comeback on the front stage. Seizing the opportunity of the debate over constitutional reform, several of the Islamic parties in the newly elected parliament advocated reintroducing the contentious 'seven words' into the Constitution. This proposal was rejected in 2002 by the MPR, due to the opposition not only of the secular parties but also of the two largest Muslim organizations, *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*. Significantly, debates shifted from the idea of Islam becoming the foundation of the state to the obligation for the government to implement *sharia* (Hosen 2005). While in the past the aim of the Muslim parties was to set up an Islamic state, now their strategy appears to be to take over the state by establishing an Islamic society.

Thus, while failing to amend the Constitution in order to impose the *sharia* nationwide, various Islamic groups have attempted to use the enhanced authority of regional parliaments under the new regional autonomy law to get elements of the *sharia* adopted into regional bylaws; this, despite the fact that religious matters fall specifically within the competence of the central government. In the following years, dozens of regencies across the country promulgated *sharia*-inspired regulations setting out dress codes and norms of good behaviour for women, and requiring religious observations for Muslim school children and public servants.

More dramatically, the resurfacing of political Islam in Indonesia has been demonstrated by the emergence of a radical fringe of Muslim fundamentalists expressing themselves through street politics, engaging in *jihad* against Christians, as well as perpetrating terrorist acts.¹⁸

These culminated with a terrorist attack on Bali in 2002, and then again in 2005. The bombings exacerbated the Balinese people's feeling of vulnerability as a Hindu island in a Muslim Archipelago. They reacted to Islamic terrorism by reasserting their 'Balinese-ness' (*Kebalian*), as exemplified in the motto *Ajeg Bali* (literally, 'Bali Stand Up'), launched with the aim of strengthening the Balinese people's sense of their religious, ethnic and cultural identity. The problem with this discourse on *Ajeg Bali* is that it tends to foster the sense of a homogeneous, closed community under threat from the outside, while

taking on ethno-nationalist implications with slogans such as 'Bali for the Balinese'. The Balinese are thus urged to take shelter in an exclusivist definition of their identity at a time when the boundary line between the inside and the outside of Bali is becoming increasingly difficult to draw and to enforce, due to the growing heterogeneity of the island's population and to the fact that, as an international tourist destination, Bali is more than ever involved in global networks of exchanges (Schulte Nordholt 2007; Lewis and Lewis 2009).

Specifically, the increasing Islamization of Indonesia appears to have triggered a mimetic reaction on the part of the Balinese people, who have come increasingly to emulate Islamic references in order to define their identity in terms of 'Hinduism' (*Agama Hindu*). Yet, this opposition between Hindu insiders and Muslim (and Christian) outsiders is untenable because, on the one hand, due to its adoption by other Indonesian ethnic groups *Agama Hindu* is no longer the possession of the Balinese people alone, while on the other hand, not all Balinese are Hindus, a significant minority having converted to Islam or Christianity, not to mention the fact that Balinese 'Hindus' have divergent conceptions regarding their religion.

Notes

- 1 See, e.g. Asad (1993), Balagangadhara (1994), McCutcheon (1997), Dubuisson (1998), Smith (1998), King (1999), Fitzgerald (2000), and Masuzawa (2005).
- 2 As is well known, Cicero's etymology related *religio* to *religare*, meaning 'to retrace' or 'to read anew'. In this acceptance, *religio* involved the scrupulous reiteration of the ritual traditions of one's ancestors. In the third century, the Christian theologian Lactantius rejected Cicero's etymology, arguing instead that *religio* derives from *religare*, meaning 'to bind' or 'to link', which eventually became the common understanding of 'religion'. On the origin and evolution of the category 'religion', see Sachot (2003).
- 3 Inasmuch as the Indonesian notion of *agama* is congruent with the Islamic definition of 'religion', it is sometimes equated to the Arabic word *din* (see, e.g. Hefner 1999: 212; Ramstedt 2004a: 9; Hosen 2005: 426, n. 21).
- 4 Derived from the Sanskrit root *gam*, 'to go', plus the privative prefix *a-*, the word *agama* literally means 'eternal' and conveys the idea of 'revelation'. Also, *agama* is one of the three ways of obtaining knowledge – the *tri-pramana* – according to Shaiva theology in India and Bali. The first is the *pratyaksha pramana*, direct perception through the senses; the second is the *anumana pramana*, perception through analysis; the third is the *agama pramana*, perception through a divine revelation received by the seers (*rsi*).
- 5 Shaiva-Siddhanta, 'the final truth of Shiva', is the most important of all the Shaiva schools, predominantly in Tamil Nadu. The primary sources of Shaiva-Siddhanta are the 28 *Shaivagama*, a body of Sanskrit texts that are treated as authoritative because they claim to have been revealed by Shiva to his *shakti* Parvati (Davis 1991).
- 6 See the collection of essays edited by Kipp and Rodgers (1987) for examples of the intrication between *adat* and *agama* in various Indonesian societies. On the other hand, the recent volume on the revival of *adat* in Indonesian politics edited by Davidson and Henley (2007) does not deal with the relationship between *adat* and *agama*, which is a rather unfortunate omission.
- 7 While this holds true to a certain extent in contemporary Bali as well, in the Balinese language, *agama* has retained its original polysemy. Thus, in the Balinese-

Indonesian dictionary issued by the Department of Education, *agama* refers at once to 'religion' (*agama*), 'law' (*hukum*), and 'customs and traditions' (*adat-istiadat*) (Warna 1990: 7). On the other hand, in his Indonesian-Balinese dictionary, the Balinese scholar Sri Reshi Anandakusuma translates *agama* by *diarna* (Anandakusuma 1986: 234).

8 One has to be aware that 'Hinduism' and 'Buddhism' are used here in an anachronistic fashion, as these labels came to the fore and became reified only in the nineteenth century. For a presentation of the spread of Indian religious traditions in Java and Bali, see Gonda (1975).

9 Following Pollock, I understand vernacularization as 'the historical process of choosing to create a written literature, along with its complement, a political discourse, in local languages according to models supplied by a superordinate, usually cosmopolitan culture' (Pollock 2006: 23).

10 See, e.g. Ellen (1983), Roff (1985), Woodward (1989), and van Bruinessen (1999).

11 The academic literature on the relations between Islam and Javanism – often expressed in terms of *agama Islam* vs *agama Jawa* – is extensive. For an overview of the debate, see Geertz (1960), Bachtiar (1973), Koenigjaringrat (1985), Stange (1986), Mulder (1998), and Beatty (1999).

12 On the historical encounter of Bali with Islam, and on the ensuing relations between Hindu Balinese and Muslims, see Vickers (1987), Couteau (1999), and Hauser-Schäublin (2004a).

13 The Indonesian word *Tuhan* originally means 'Lord', and by extension 'God'. While the most common translation of *Ketuhanan* is 'Belief in God', it would be more correct to translate it as 'Lordship' (Darmaputera 1988: 153; Intan 2006: 73). The other principles are nationhood, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice. On Pancasila, see Bonneff *et al.* (1980), on the long-drawn-out opposition between the Islamic and the nationalist groups, see Bolland (1982), and on the intricate relations between traditionalists and modernists Muslims, see Feillard and Madinier (2000).

14 On Javanese mysticism, see Hadiwijono (1967), Howell (1977), Stange (1980), Geels (1997), and Mulder (1998); and on Theosophy in the Dutch East Indies, see de Tollenaere (2004).

15 *Penetapan Presiden No. 11/1965 tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama*. This decree made it illegal to slander, interpret falsely or promote teachings which depart from the core teachings of any of the state-sanctioned religions.

16 Even more so than the Balinese, the adherents of Buddhism and Confucianism experienced numerous institutional and theological difficulties in their endeavour to reinvent their religion as monotheism in order for it to be classified as *agama*. On the fate of Buddhism and Confucianism in independent Indonesia, see respectively Brown (2004) and Abalakin (2005).

17 Even though in 2000 Abdurrahman Wahid issued a Presidential Decree that reinstated Confucianism (*Agama Khonghucu*) as a legitimate religion, its institutional status is still open to question (Abalakin 2005). According to the 2000 census, 88.22 per cent of the population label themselves Muslim, 5.87 per cent Protestant, 3.05 per cent Catholic, 1.81 per cent Hindu, 0.84 per cent Buddhist, and 0.2 per cent 'other', including traditional indigenous religions.

18 The literature on radical Islam is extensive. For a comprehensive overview of the genealogy and recent developments of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia, see van Bruinessen (2002), and Feillard and Madinier (2006).

Part I Java