Kolloquium Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften - Ronald Asch, Marie Seong-Hak Kim, Martin Loughlin
von 11:15 bis 12:45
|Wo||FRIAS, Albertstr. 19, Seminarraum|
|Kontakttelefon||+49 (0)761 203-97362|
universitätsöffentlich / open to university members
Fundamental law and constitutional thought: past, present and future
Today, it is trite to say that the constitution has the status of fundamental law: we say that ordinary law is made by the legislature and the constitution is fundamental because it is the law that makes the legislature. But this notion of fundamental law has an ambiguous history and bequeaths an uncertain legacy. First coined in the 16th century, it was used variously to refer to ancient laws that constrained the prince and more recent ideas of natural right that rested the authority of the office on contract. Was the law fundamental because it was ancient or because it expressed ‘right reason’? Did the term refer to the entire corpus of customary law or to a special type of constitutional law? And what has it come to mean in the modern era of constitution-making? If constitutions are made by the sovereign authority of ‘the people’, can there ever be a concept of fundamental law other than the sovereign will of the nation?