Prof. Dr. Diana Panke
Professor Diana Panke holds the Chair of Multi-level Governance at University of Freiburg (Germany) and has previously been associate professor at University College Dublin (Ireland). Her research and teaching interests include international norm dynamics, international negotiations, legalization and compliance beyond the nation-state, European Integration, Comparative European Union Politics, as well as modern theories of international relations. Her articles are published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Review of International Studies, Comparative Political Studies, the European Journal of International Relations, Cooperation and Conflict, International Politics, Comparative European Politics, West European Politics, the Journal of European Public Policy, or the Journal of Common Market Studies. In addition, Diana Panke has published several monographs including The Effectiveness of the European Court of Justice: Why Reluctant States Comply (Manchester University Press), Small States in the European Union. Coping with Structural Disadvantages (Ashgate) and Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions. Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (forthcoming fall 2013 with Palgrave).
- The Effectiveness of the European Court of Justice: Why Reluctant States Comply (Manchester University Press)
- Small States in the European Union. Coping with Structural Disadvantages (Ashgate)
- Unequal Actors in Equalising Institutions. Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (forthcoming fall 2013 with Palgrave)
Voting Alignment in Multilateral Negotiations: Why Small States Change Their Voting Behavior
Sovereignty is an important building block of the modern international state system and the number of sovereign states increased to about 200 during the last two centuries. Today, sovereign states cooperate in a broad range of policy areas and cooperation is institutionalized in more than 5.000 International Organizations (IOs) and regimes. Although formally equal at the international level, states differ in multiple respects, most notably in their financial resources (economic size). The project seeks to shed light on the behavior of small states in multilateral negotiations. More precisely, it examines the rationales underlying the voting behavior of small states. Can bigger states, especially developmental aid donors, ‘buy’ the support of smaller aid recipient states and if so under which conditions? What additional considerations guide the voting behavior of small states and changes thereof? To answer these questions, the research group develops a theoretical push-pull model on voting rationales of states and tests it comprehensively with a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. To this end, we draw on the United Nations General Assembly. It is a good testing ground to analyze vote-buying as it is the IO with the largest worldwide membership; accordingly, major developmental donors and recipients negotiate at the same table.